The Central Bank of Russia is being clear that his attitude to banks has changed after a series of illegal and semi-legal bankruptcies late last year and early this year. But is the case of Ourin's banks, the case of Mezhprombank and the case of the Bank of Moscow the real reason for such change, or have they been merely a pretext for stricter supervision? What are the tasks for the Association of Russian Banks in view of this new situation? These and other questions have been answered by Garegin TOSUNYAN, president of the ARB, in this interview to the NBJ.

“RUSSIA HAS TO ATTRACT NOT ONLY FIVE-STAR INVESTORS”

NBJ: Mr. Tosunyan, it has been often stated recently that Russia has an unfavourable investment climate, and this is largely the reason for the inability of the economy to restore the pre-crisis growth rates. What are the reasons for such climate, how bad do you think it is and are there ways and mechanisms to improve it?

G. TOSUNYAN: I'm an optimist, and I'm not one of those scaremongers who claim that everything is terrible. Our country has such opportunities and potential that even with the negative phenomena that it had, has and will have, it remains attractive for investors. This is proven by the recent figures: according to Rosstat, foreign investment into Russia in Q1 2011 was 44 billion dollars, which is 3.5 times more than in the previous year.

This is a general answer to your question. As for the details about the problem of bad investment climate, I have often cited the figures and opinions of various international institutions confirming the unfavourable business climate in Russia. For example, let's take the Ease of Doing Business Index published annually by the World Bank: in the latest index for 2010, Russia moved down from 120th to the 123rd place. Many other indicators, such as capital outflow, prove that there are serious problems that prevent people from investing into the Russian economy.

NBJ: You said that the trend has reversed in the first quarter of the year: capital outflow changed into capital inflow. On the other hand, it is often suggested that most of this inflow is not true foreign investments, but rather investments by former Russian nationals.

G. TOSUNYAN: Indeed, we have to admit that the largest and most active sources of investment into the Russian economy are Luxembourg and Cyprus, which have been offshore territories until recently. Actually, the same happened in the previous decade, when the money of former Russian residents has started to return to Russia thanks to favourable economic conditions. Foreign investors were and are quickly reacting to the behavior and attitudes of Russian investors.

NBJ: One of the key obstacles to foreign investors must be an inefficient tax policy, isn't it?

G. TOSUNYAN: I wouldn't say it's the only key reason, although the inconsistency of the tax policy is indeed a negative factor. Among other important reasons are: unclear money and credit policy, and the short-sighted policy of moderating the growth of the credit market and investments. In these conditions, investors decide in favour of another country to apply their capitals and wait until Russian authorities realize what they want - to have businesspeople plan for the long term or to have them looking for safer places to invest into. What's interesting, investors are not convinced even by the highest profitability in the financial market. I often thought why people keep hundreds of millions and billions of rubles in Russian banks, even though they were cases when money was stolen from safe deposit boxes or bank accounts. The answer is obvious: it is because of the extremely high profitability compared to other countries, so high that it even covers the theoretical risks.

NBJ: However, it has significantly decreased in the last two years.

G. TOSUNYAN: Still, it is much higher than in the European markets or in the US market. The ruble continues to grow, and the consequences of the devaluation in late 2008 and early 2009 have been largely eliminated. Nevertheless, investors are reluctant to return to Russia. And if we do not figure out why, we will face the continued economic stagnation.

NBJ: That's what we wouldn't like to have.

G. TOSUNYAN: Now, let's consider the following. In my view, the issue number one is corruption. Corruption always exists, as it is an integral part of any economy, it just has to be kept within reasonable limits. This is why, and also to keep demands of the tax authorities, excessive administration and abuse of powers within reasonable limits, we need an adequate judicial system. It is a tool to counteract various abuses, a tool for defending one's rights. This is why many problems often boil down to problems in the judicial and law enforcement systems.

NBJ: Isn't the law enforcement system a derivative of the judicial system?

G. TOSUNYAN: It is not derivative, but rather an auxiliary system, as it ensure the order of law, records crime and other facts that can be a basis for a legal claim. The law enforcement system is also the first test of the rule of law and adequacy of the judicial system. As we see now, most often it is the police who abuse their powers, as we are more likely to face them than tax inspectors or utility company officials. If the judicial system quickly and efficiently responds to abuses in the law enforcement system, it means it's working efficiently. People have to be sure that they will be able to defend their interests and their rights infringed by an official, a fraudulent partner or criminals. This is one of the key components of investors' comfort, and as such, one of the key components of the good investment climate in the country.

Another extremely important factor is the infrastructure. Investors are just regular people, and when they intend to invest into some business, they first want to come and see this business for themselves. That means he has to at least fly into the country, check in at a hotel and drive to the place of his future investment. He wants to make sure that the place has adequate conditions for himself and for his employees that he will send here after deciding to invest. The investor wants to see if he understands this new world and if this world is suitable for establishing normal business relationships.

As you see, it's not something very complex, it's just basic comfort. Not all investors are large investors, not everyone can afford five-star service and not everyone drives a Bentley and flies a helicopter. There may be a few dozens of investors like this, but we should try to attract not only them but also those who are ready to invest into small and medium Russian businesses. The investment climate should be developed diversely, otherwise we will depend on a limited number of large investors who may pack and leave as soon as they see any signs of a worsening economic situation. The diversified market behaves differently, by changing the structure of investments in response to changes in market trends.

“THERE IS A BASIC LEGAL PRINCIPLE -THE CONDITIONS OF BUSINESS CANNOT BE WORSENED RETROSPECTIVELY”

NBJ: At the end of July, we learned that foreign banks are rushing to Brazil and lining up to get a license to operate there. In Russia, however, the situation seems to be quite the opposite. In your opinion, what is the reason for this?

G. TOSUNYAN: I do not think that we have an opposite situation. Foreign banks do not leave, they just revise their strategies, changing the segments where they want to develop their business, leaving some segments and entering some new ones. Speaking of Brazil, it has a completely different level of investor-friendliness compared to Russia. So it is not surprising that foreign banks show more interest in that country. By the way, Brazil indeed has a well-organized and efficient law enforcement system, which, as I said, is critical for investors.

NBJ: Nevertheless, foreign investors seem to be less enthusiastic about the Russian banking market: those who came here in the 2000s do not leave, but no new banks enter the market, too. Why? Foreign financial groups entering the Russian market are definitely five-star investors and they are hardly turned off by the poor roads or lack of comfort - they just don't come across any of these issues.

G. TOSUNYAN: Poor roads and lack of comfort are a problem for everyone. A five-star investor realizes that an efficient business has many layers, and every layer employs different people with different qualifications and a different salary. This five-star investor will enjoy top class reception, but employees of lower rank will follow, and it is them who may have issues with comfort. Will he have to go to Russia every time to solve these issues? Isn't it easier to just find another country to invest into?

NBJ: In the 2000s, the roads and comfort of living in Russia were much worse, but investors didn't seem to be put off.

G. TOSUNYAN: This is not true, they have always been put off. However, in the previous decade, they had a chance to get huge return on investment. But when the 1000% margin reduces to 100% and then to 10%, investor behavior is sure to change. This is exactly the reason why large investors with speculative intentions leave so quickly: they get the margin and withdraw the money. Those who came to Russia with long-term intentions do remain in Russia, but they are careful and do not develop their business as quickly as before. The best example here is the consumer credit market: when it used to double each year in early 2000s, it was a completely different thing. Now that you see only 20% to 30% growth instead of 100% to 120%, you may want to reduce your presence in this segment, especially since the consumer credit market is closely related to the judicial system.

NBJ: What do you mean by 'related'?

G. TOSUNYAN: I mean that many issues that arise in connection with consumer credits are resolved in court. And unfortunately, this is where the rules of the game are changed retrospectively. The bank does its business legally, and then there's a decision of the Supreme Commercial Court that credit account opening and maintenance fees are illegal, and this decision allows submitting retrospective claims against banks under credit agreements that have been completed and terminated long ago. This creates an atmosphere of indefiniteness in the market which is difficult to work in.

NBJ: This may be a common issue for developing countries - they cannot create a loophole-free legal framework within a short time.

G. TOSUNYAN: There is a basic legal principle - the conditions of business cannot be worsened retrospectively. You cannot fine banks and file claims against them for charging fees when such fees were still not prohibited.

So what is the result of such decisions of the Supreme Commercial Court and the requirements for larger reserves by the regulator? The result is that the access of individuals and legal entities to loans is hindered. A customer comes to the bank, submits a loan application, and is offered completely unacceptable conditions. Naturally, the customer starts asking why, and this is what the bank replies: you have no collateral and cannot provide a multi-volume set of documents about you and your relatives, including grandparents. Thus, according to the requirements of the Central Bank, we have to classify your loan as quality class 2 or 3, and create increased reserves for it. It will be expensive for us, which is why we offer you the interest rate of 20% p.a. rather than 12%.

“ABSOLUTELY STABILITY IS ONLY FOUND IN THE GRAVEYARD, OR AT ZERO DEGREES KELVIN”

NBJ: The Central Bank provides quite convincing explanations on this issue: it created these strict reserve requirements because it tries to save banks from assuming increased credit risks. Isn't this policy of the regulator similar to the worldwide supervision practice?

G. TOSUNYAN: Referring to international trends is irrelevant. Last month, the ARB had a meeting with one of the heads of the banking supervision and regulation department of the Federal Reserve System of the USA. He has severely criticized Basel II and Basel III. I completely agree with him, as the Basel standards used to be developed by market players and should not turn into fire and brimstone used by some central banks to introduce stricter supervision. This includes, unfortunately, our own central bank, which, I suppose, tries to bring all credit risks down to zero out of the best intentions. But this is against common sense: the sphere of credits cannot have zero risks! The problem is how adequate are these risks, how clear they are and whether the bank has sufficient stability margin to respond to these risks on its own. When the Central Bank basically says “I want you to have no risks at all” -well, maybe it is also going to provide loans on its own? Maybe it is also going to assume all risks?

This is a very complex and philosophical issue. The Central Bank forgets that its task is not only to ensure stability, but also to develop the credit market. It forgets that there is the notion of stable development, and the key word here is development. Absolutely stability is only found in the graveyard or at zero degrees kelvin. Although we have not reached that point yet, 4% annual GDP growth and 10% to 12% growth in the credit market is not development, it is stagnation. And that way leads us nowhere.

NBJ: But the Central Bank says that the growth rate of 30% to 40% may result in an overheated credit market, and the bank will again assume too high risks.

G. TOSUNYAN: Nobody calls for reckless lending. It has to be a fine-tuned job, for example, selecting the segments of the economy that have to be developed with loaned funds. I often cite Canada as an example, where this segment is the property market for socially disadvantaged people. The government there acts as the 100% guarantor under mortgage loans, and it provides economic incentive for banks to provide loans at a minimal rate and assumes all repayment risks. In this way, the government develops the residential construction market - not the market of high-end property affordable only for the few millionaires, but the economical property for less wealthy people. As a result, the mortgage market and the property market develop, and due to the chain effect it also creates growth in the construction materials market, it creates jobs and so on.

And this is not about giving property away for free: the government does force people to repay the debt because it assumes all credit risks. As a result, people are more interested in a stable job, in earning income and so on. In a sense, this is the philosophy of Henry Ford who produced cheap vehicles and sold them to his employees in installments. This way he encouraged them for a higher quality of life and also attached them to his business.

NBJ: Sound a little bit like selfdom.

G. TOSUNYAN: Now you just speak the language of those people who say that any loan is selfdom. It is not selfdom, it is a normal civilized way of lending. If I may use your language, aren't the banks themselves slaves - they take deposits and thus become dependent on millions of creditors? The area of credit and finance is not slavery, the relationships here are based on mutual agreement and not on enslavement.

NBJ: You said that the Central Bank only intends to ensure stability in the banking market and forgets about another goal - to develop this market; banks should independently judge the adequacy of risks and be responsible for them. If they fail, it is their responsibility and their fate. In real life, however, don't we see a different situation where the government has to bail out banks that practiced inadequately risk lending policy?

G. TOSUNYAN: Please don't tell me this tale how the government bails out any bank that practiced a wrong credit policy and faced a difficult situation. The bailout process was selective, and in some cases the government acts not out of economic reasons. In some cases, banks used to be completely stable before the government started to “bail” them out. All of their troubles only appeared after the government decided to acquire them.

Let me repeat that unfortunately, the government does not bail out banks. If it did, or at least purchased bad debt from the banks, we would only welcome this. Some time ago we suggested a mechanism for such purchases - the Bank Assets Insurance Fund. Note that it was supposed to be repaid, resulting in temporary removal of bad debt from the balance sheets of banks. And of course, we agreed that the government may control the business of banks from which it purchased bad debt, by adding its representatives to the board of directors and management boards of banks and control every expense. If the government does rehabilitate the bank or manage its bad debt, this is not a problem. But if the government provides no support and it only gives orders and instructions, why does it tell the bank how to evaluate the debtors? Why do banks have to work under a system of supervision that is based on the principle of presumption of guilt?

NBJ: Does the regulator apply this principle?

G. TOSUNYAN: Unfortunately, yes, and this principle does not only apply to banks that used to violate any regulations, but to any credit institutions that the Central Bank never had a grudge against. We have an impression that the regulator sees every bank as a potential offender, and this is why it demands to create reserves for any theoretical - and I want to stress the word theoretical - possibility of fraud. This is a very coarse job. Western countries have a very good system: on the one hand, they have the presumption of innocence, and on the other hand, they put a label on people or entities that violated some regulations. They are not deprived of their rights, they are not persecuted, but their credibility is undermined. This is why in Western countries, banks may provide a loan to a company without sufficient collateral or careful check of the biography of the owner or manager, provided, of course, that the bank used to work with this company and built the relationships based on mutual trust.

I am convinced that this should also be the principle of the relationships between banks and the Central Bank who is the ultimate creditor. If a bank did not have any serious issues for many years, why do you now suspect it of fraud? Is that because there appeared as much as four mirrored notes in the market and you cannot guarantee that no one continues to issue them? This cannot be guarantee of course, but this is not the reason to see no one but fraudsters around you.

NBJ: So maybe the issue is the crisis of trust to the banking system by the Central Bank? After some well-known criminal bankruptcies this wouldn't have been surprising.

G. TOSUNYAN: Not at all. This is obviously the common Russian philosophy: never trust anyone. So you cannot say that the Central Bank had to change its attitude to market players after a series of bankruptcies. Let us review all the recent cases of license cancellations and we will see that there have been political factors in nearly every case. Until the alleged owner of the so-called Ourin's banks attacked the car of a high-ranking foreigner, there have been no claims against him. As soon as he got involved into a scandal, all of the claims that has accumulated in years against the banks allegedly in this group of banks suddenly surfaced. It is still unclear which of the banks were actually involved in such group and which of them got caught just for better stats. Even if all of these banks have committed any offences, why would all market players be under suspicion now?

NBJ: Still, the regulator used to have a different policy before the crisis and especially before the series of illegal and semi-legal bankruptcies.

G. TOSUNYAN: Not always. The mentality of Russian administration inherited from the Soviet times is to consider everyone as potential offender by default. This attitude formed in the times when the Central Bank was managed by Georgy Matyukhin (chairman of the Bank of Russia from December 1991 to June 1992 - editor's note), but under Viktor Gerashchenko, then Sergei Dubinin and later under Sergei Ignatyev, the attitude towards banks changed for the better. However, the inertia of the strict approach is slow and difficult to overcome. As you see, as soon as there is any new pretext, the regulator returns to the same old philosophy. Banks, however, cannot treat their customers as fraudsters, as they operate in a competitive environment and look for reasons for granting loans.

NBJ: Banks earn money on lending, while the Central Bank has no financial interest.

G. TOSUNYAN: This is true. They have a different interest: the fewer banks they have in control, the better. And surprisingly, this philosophy appears in statements by very professional managers of the Central Bank. The ARB cooperates with many of them, and many of them are also our friends. But I am disappointed to see that there remains the Soviet mentality that rejects the presumption of innocence. Everyone who drives on the Russian roads is a fraudster and criminal, they would think, but why? Maybe because the roads are bad and thus preclude any driving culture?

Let me give you this approximate but clear analogy: you cannot force a child to be tidy and neat if he has to live in a dirty house with no bathroom. Why would he wash his hands if everything he touches is dirty? Now, if this child lives in a good and clean house with running water, soap and towels, he will quickly learn the hygiene. His philosophy and culture will change, but in order to do that, somebody should keep the house clean at all times.

In the financial market, it is the government that has to set the rules and create the culture. If I may go back to the analogy with driving, it is the government that has to do the road marking, but the marking should not turn into barriers that prevent everyone from driving. You cannot turn the Federal Law No. 115-FZ into a weapon of punishment, and you cannot pass the Instruction No. 110 in a revision that prevents banks from offering good interest rates due to the increased reserve requirements. And these regulations cannot be justified by the so-called Ourin Effect or by the government having to bail out banks at a loss.

By the way, speaking of this well-known and widely discussed case, nobody forced the government to buy the bank at a loss. There have been clear political reasons behind every license cancellation in late 2010 and early 2011.

“THE TASK OF THE ASSOCIATION IS TO PROVIDE TO THE REGULATOR THE INTEGRAL VISION OF MARKET PLAYERS”

NВJ: Am I correct that one of the tasks of the Association of Russian Banks is to change the attitude of the Central Bank, make it more loyal and less police-like?

G. TOSUNYAN: One of the key functions of the association is to provide to the regulator the integral vision of market players and serve as a buffer between the banks and the regulator. This buffer is needed by both parties. Sometimes the Central Bank wants to do something good, but doesn't know how to explain its decisions correctly so that they were better accepted by market players. In these cases, we should adapt such decisions and explain them to bankers. If market players want to voice their opinion to the regulator, our task is to sort out the unnecessary information and to single out the most important information.

NBJ: So the key function of the ARB is to act as a link between the market players and the regulator?

G. TOSUNYAN: One of the key functions. Now that self-regulation is being discussed, a draft law has been submitted to the government where we are almost assigned the supervisory functions.

NBJ: How do you regard this initiative?

G. T0SUNYAN:This has to be done very carefully as there may be many problems if the country is going to have two supervisory bodies at the same time. I think one of the biggest advantages of the Association is that while it has no administrative leverage, it accumulates the opinions of market players, establishes the relationships between them and the regulating bodies, levels out any internal differences within the system and deducts the common direction of development using roundtable discussions. We cannot give orders to members of the Association and we do not have any leverage against the supervisory body, but this is what enables us to have a somewhat detached point of view, resulting in more objectivity. This is why I do not think that we need any supervisory functions. We certainly strive to increase our competence, but we do this through working out standards that would be accepted by banks and that market players would comply with in their business. This is a very fine and difficult job to do, but the market needs it, as it needs the Association itself.

NBJ: Is it proven by the number of member banks in the Association?

G. TOSUNYAN: The proof is that banks join the Association and cooperate with it, even though it would be easier to just leave it as soon you don't like something. We do not force anyone to join the Association and we do not force anyone to be a member - on the contrary, we strictly filter and clean up the system if we come across fraudulent behavior of any members of the Association. I am convinced that banks strive to be members of the ARB because they think it is a really important entity: without using any administrative leverage, the Association creates the culture of the civil society in the market. Actually, it is the job of the regulator, but it seems to have so many issues with mirrored notes that it probably has better things to do.

NBJ: So in your vision, one of the key tasks of the ARB is to create the new culture in the market based on trust and presumption of innocence. This may be difficult to do when some kind of bankophobia is emerging in the market - and not that of customers towards banks, but also from small banks to large state-owned banks, and vice versa.

G. TOSUNYAN: This is not a phobia, just some insecurity that all of us have, including small banks. On the other hand, it is obvious that small and even large private banks are criticizing state-owned banks. This is natural, because even though we had managed to solve some problems during the crisis very quickly, the competitive environment has suffered. The resources and market shares were redistributed towards a very limited number of the largest players under the pretext of supporting the stability of the banking system.

Another negative factor is the Soviet way of thinking that some people cannot abandon: if I have access to top officials making important political decisions and get support there, that means I can completely disregard other market players. Thanks god this is not true and those who do think so are not forward-thinking. The world has changed, and not everything depends from the top officials now. If you cannot build relationships with people, if you neglect your partners, customers, colleagues and employees, sooner or later you'll break your neck. Which is good, because you may learn that you cannot only depend on the top officials, cannot despise those below you and less wealthy than you. In my opinion, people sticking to the principle “I only speak to those who are worth a billion, others cannot even approach me” should be ridiculed and isolated from the discussion in a civilized society. Such people should live on a remote island, eat their money and drink liquid gold. This is where they should boast their wealth and luxury.

Same for banking. You cannot neglect people or banks only because they are smaller than market leaders. Second and third tier banks also perform a very important function in their area and in their competence. In banking, we should establish and promote the culture that would an example for other industries.

“LARGE SCALE MEANS NOT ONLY UNLIMITED COMPETITIVE ABILITIES, BUT ALSO A HUGE RESPONSIBILITY”

NBJ: You said that some time ago the government has disturbed the competitive environment in the market. You may have meant that state support was mainly provided to state-owned bank and to a lesser extent to large private banks. Then, it may be up to the government to restore the competitive environment. What do you think should be done for this purpose and is this possible at all?

G. TOSUNYAN: Certainly. There are some indications that the government is ready to restore the competition. The banking industry development strategy for 2015 has been passed, which envisions privatization of state banks and has initially planned to reduce the share of the state to 51%. At a meeting with the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister, the Association of Russian Banks has raised the question why the Strategy has this limit of 51%. Our opinion was heard and the limit was lifted.

NВJ: What do you think will be the result of reducing the share of state to 30% or even 20%? Banks with state ownership will still be regarded by Russians as the most stable and reliable, i.e. they will keep their competitive abilities. If they have problems, the state will bail them out anyway, regardless of its ownership share.

G. TOSUNYAN: I agree, the state will provide support for banks with state ownership even if its share is below 51%. What's important is that all banks will be equal for consumers of financial services. This is why people will carefully think whether they want to keep their money in banks with state ownership and get a negative return on investment, or deposit their money at a private bank with higher interest rates. Indeed, people now often select state-owned banks because they believe they are stable by definition, whatever happens to the economy of the country. This thinking will not change quickly, there is some inertia, but people will progressively start treating banks with state ownership just like any other market player.

Another important point: changes in the ownership structure of a bank inevitably cause changes in the board of directors. New shareholders will be represented, which will cause changes in the strategy of the bank. It is quite possible that they will discuss whether state banks compete with everyone else or whether they should focus on developing some areas of business, for example, the retail business. At the moment, when the state orders state-owned banks to finance a project, they cannot refuse, even if they realize that it is not profitable for them. After the share of the state in such banks is reduced, banks will be able to reject such orders. In this way, they will have a new competitive philosophy with its advantages and disadvantages.

NBJ: Speaking of disadvantages: do you think that after the share of the state is reduced, these banks will become even more competitive?

G. TOSUNYAN: I hope they will. Right now the state-owned banks are less competitive not because the state demands too much from them, but because their huge scale of business makes them inert and difficult to control. Remember Lehman Brothers, which is a good example of what happens when such giant financial structures collapse. This is why not every bank wants to grow that big; the market philosophy is aimed at diversification.

NBJ: And we mention Lehman Brothers here for a good reason when we speak about state-owned banks. They are classical too-big-to-fail banks. Do you think it is a good thing to do when the government selects some banks that it will not allow to fail in any circumstances? How is this approach consistent with the basic principles of market economy?

G. TOSUNYAN: Absolutely inconsistent. The market economy means that the idea of having banks or non-financial companies that are too big to fail should be abandoned. The market economy means that the financial authorities attach a special importance to the banking system and try to find tools that would prevent banks from collapsing. For socially important banks, the government adopts a special supervision mode that partly serves to limit their abilities and risks. This is where the new modes of supervision that the Central Bank is now proposing should be applied. The principle should be the same as in building dams: if it should keep thousands of tons of water, you use a lot of concrete to build it. If you build a dam for a tiny river, these precautions are not necessary, because if a big dam fails, everyone may be flooded, while if a dam on a tiny river fails, nobody will be seriously hurt.

NBJ: So you think that Basel II and Basel II should apply not to all market players but only to the core banks?

G. TOSUNYAN: Mainly to the core banks, of course. If you want to be too big to fail, get ready for too big supervision. Bank owners would think twice whether they want to grow so big as to become subject to the special mode of supervision or stay at the current level. Even now there are banks in the market that are happy with their position: they do not want to lose a market share, but they also do not want to grow at any price. Their owners and managers may realize that being large-scale means not only unlimited competitive abilities, but also a huge responsibility.

NBJ: Obviously not everyone understands it yet.

G. TOSUNYAN: This is why the government should make them realize that being large-scale mainly means responsibility, rather than a benefit and a gift of heaven. If something fails, you are going to be personally liable under the law, to your colleagues, employees and to yourself. This responsibility is the basis for the new culture of a developed society. We do have difficulties on this way, but I am sure we will succeed.